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1. Introduction 
In recent history, interest rate policy has widely been the most important measure 
that central banks have used to conduct monetary policy in order to keep interest 
rates low and stimulate economic growth. However, in the recent two decades there 
has been increasing discussion about alternative methods of conducting monetary 
policy besides interest rate policy, which are collectively referred to as 
unconventional monetary policy. This discussion has become relevant in today’s 
economic landscape because of two major factors: the recent global economic 
recession caused by the 2008 financial crisis and nominal interest rates approaching 
the zero lower bound limit. 
The nominal interest rate policy that central banks use is determined using a wide 
variety of macroeconomic signals, all of which the central banks do not necessarily 
disclose, but it can be approximated using the Taylor rule. The Taylor rule 
approximates interest rate policy to rely on two factors: inflation and the output gap 
(i.e. the difference between an economy’s output and its potential output). As the 
output gap increases during a recession, meaning that gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth becomes smaller than the potential GDP growth of an economy, the Taylor 
rule states that the target interest rates of central banks will go down. This is in of 
itself not an issue, but when paired with the zero lower bound problems start to arise. 
The zero lower bound refers to the fact that in practice target nominal interest rates 
set by central banks are effectively constrained to zero (or very closer to it). The 
interest rates are constrained to zero because if interest rates would fall below zero, 
cash would become a viable investment. This could cause a crash in the demand for 
financial assets such as stocks and bonds and fire-sales of these financial assets, 
causing a variety of problems for the financial market and the whole economy. The 
severity of the recession caused by the 2008 financial crisis has caused the zero lower 
bound limit to become constraining, meaning that the Taylor rule would suggest 
lowering nominal interest rates below zero. 
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Another noteworthy aspect of the 2008 financial crisis was the major frictions that 
sprung up in the financial sector. The liquidity problems that financial intermediaries, 
or banks, faced caused by the burst of the housing market bubble combined with the 
uncertainty brought by the collapse of Lehman Brothers resulted in the whole 
financial market effectively coming to a standstill. The standstill and the frictions it 
caused in the financial sector resulted in a decrease in the effectiveness of 
conventional monetary policy, as the premium that financial intermediaries charge 
increased due to the uncertainty and risk in the market, meaning that the 
transmission mechanism of interest rate policy practiced by the central bank is 
broken. As we will see later, this increase in friction also increases the effectiveness 
of unconventional monetary policy. 
These reasons have caused conventional monetary policy to become an inadequate 
measure in order to conduct successful monetary policy in crisis situations, and major 
central banks such as the Federal Reserve of the United States of America and the 
European Central Bank have implemented monetary policy that is considered 
unconventional after the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps the most important form of 
unconventional monetary policy implemented by these two central banks, and the 
one that this paper will focus on, is the central bank’s balance sheet expansion as a 
form of monetary policy. This is commonly referred to as credit policy, credit easing 
or most commonly as quantitative easing.  
The terms credit easing and quantitative easing technically mean different things 
although they have similar goals: credit easing means that the central bank buys 
assets from the private sector such as corporate bonds, while quantitative easing 
means that the central bank buys government bond or other long term assets 
(Investopedia). In this paper, the term credit policy will be used as an umbrella term 
for both quantitative easing and credit easing. This is because within the model used 
in this paper, the two have identical effects. This will be explained in more detail in 
section 2.7. 
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This paper will examine the situations where credit policy can be an effective tool for 
conducting monetary policy, and discuss whether credit easing could be 
implemented alongside traditional interest rate policy in a normal economic 
situation, or whether it should be used merely as an unconventional monetary policy 
in unconventional economic situations such as the post 2008 period. This will be done 
by approaching this question using macroeconomic models that simulate the effect 
that credit policy practiced by central banks can have on an economy. The primary 
model used in the analysis is a model created by Gertler and Karadi (2011).  
This paper will first introduce the model created by Gertler and Karadi (2011) which 
will be used for the analysis. Some results obtained from this model will then be 
discussed, and it is shown that credit policy conducted by the central bank can have 
a significant impact on the recovery of an economy from a crisis, such as the one 
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2. The model 
The model that will be used for the analysis done in this paper is a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model (DSGE) based on models developed by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). These models have 
been developed further by Gertler and Karadi (2011), who added financial 
intermediaries that transfer funds between households and firms and an exogenous 
shock in the quality of capital. This shock in capital quality is meant to represent a 
sudden shock in asset prices such as the shock in mortgage-backed securities prices 
that triggered the 2008 financial crisis. These additions are meant to create a model 
that can better capture the conditions of the 2008 financial crisis, where distrust in 
the financial sector created very notable frictions in the sector. When the financial 
sector is not working as efficiently as usual, this degrades the effectiveness of 
conventional monetary policy as the transmission mechanism of interest policy relies 
on a functioning financial sector. This is why the additions to the base models made 
by Gertler and Karadi are important, since these base models are unable to properly 
capture the situation during the 2008 crisis. 
The model has five different agents, which are discussed in sections 2.1 through 2.5. 
It also has a central bank that conducts both regular monetary policy, which is 
discussed in section 2.6, and credit policy, which is discussed in section 2.7. 
2.1 Households 
Households in the model are identical. Households supply labor, for which they earn 
income. This income is either consumed or saved. Households can save by lending 
funds to financial intermediaries, so keeping their money in a bank account, or by 
lending funds to the government. 
 Household members can be either bankers or any other type of workers, which will 
collectively be referred to as simply workers. Each banker manages a financial 
intermediary and transfers income to the household, meaning that households own 
the financial intermediaries that their bankers manage. Workers supply all kinds of 
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other labor and also transfer income to the household. Household savings are 
deposited into intermediaries that the household does not own. This is important for 
the formation of the agency problem discussed in the next section. 
Within a household there is perfect consumption insurance, meaning that the 
households consume and save in such a way that their utility gained from 
consumption stays constant over time. Additionally, the households act rationally in 
this model, meaning that they will maximize their utility within the constraints of 
their budget. 
2.2 Financial intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries lend funds that they received from households to non-
financial firms. The financial intermediaries of this model consist of the whole 
banking sector, meaning that investment banks and commercial banks are both 
included in this category. 
Let us denote the amount of wealth or net worth of an intermediary 𝑗 at the end of 
period 𝑗 as 𝑁𝑗𝑡, the deposits the intermediary holds as 𝐵𝑗𝑡, the quantity of financial 
claims the intermediary has collected by loaning money to non-financial firms as 𝑆𝑗𝑡 
and the relative price of each claim as 𝑄𝑡. Then the intermediary balance sheet is 
given by: 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 = 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝐵𝑗𝑡         (1) 
The right side of the equation is the intermediaries equity and liabilities and the left 
side is its assets. The deposits 𝐵𝑗𝑡 earn a return of 𝑅𝑡+1 and the financial claims 
𝑆𝑗𝑡 earn a return of 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 at 𝑡 + 1. This means that over time, the development of 
the intermediaries net worth if given by: 
 𝑁𝑗𝑡+1 =  (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡+1𝑁𝑗𝑡      (2) 
So growth in the intermediaries net worth depends on the premium it charges 
(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) and the amount of assets it holds 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡. As the intermediary will 
attempt to increase its net worth, it is beneficial for the banker to increase the size 
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of its assets. This holds when the risk adjusted return of the intermediary is greater 
than or equal to what the household can earn on its deposits, since if the risk adjusted 
return of the intermediary is smaller than what households can earn on deposits the 
intermediary could earn more by loaning all of its assets to another intermediary. 
To remove a limitless expansion of an intermediaries assets, the model introduces an 
agency problem. The banker who manages the financial intermediary can divert a 
fraction of the intermediaries assets to their household, and the depositors cannot 
get these funds back. The risk for the banker is that its depositors can force the 
intermediary into bankruptcy. So for lenders to be willing to deposit money in the 
intermediary, the cost caused to the banker by the closing the intermediary must be 
higher than the gain the banker receives from the diverted assets. This incentive 
constraint for lenders can be expressed by: 
𝜂𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝜐𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 ≥ 𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡        (3) 
where 𝜆 is the amount of funds diverted, 𝜂𝑡 is the expected discounted value of 
having another unit of 𝑁𝑗𝑡 while holding 𝑆𝑗𝑡 constant and 𝜐𝑡is the expected 
discounted marginal gain to the banker for expanding its assets (𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡) by a unit. So 
the left side is the cost for the banker to divert 𝜆 amount of funds and the right side 
is the benefit for the banker to do this. 
This agency problem creates a scenario where financial intermediaries cannot 
increase their assets indefinitely because households will not be willing to deposit 
funds to an intermediary indefinitely due to the increased risk of their funds being 
diverted by the bank into the bankers own household. When the constraint in 




𝑁𝑗𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡         (4) 
where 𝜙𝑡 is the ratio of intermediated assets to equity, or leverage ratio, meaning 
that an intermediaries ability to acquire assets is bound by its leverage ratio. 
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2.3 Intermediate goods firms 
Intermediate goods firms are firms that produce goods which are then sold to retail 
firms. These firms use capital to produce their goods and they finance their capital 
purchases by borrowing funds from financial intermediaries, and this capital can be 
sold during later periods. In this model there are no frictions in the market between 
intermediate goods firms and financial intermediaries, meaning that a firm’s ability 
to acquire funds is constrained only by the supply of funds that financial 
intermediaries have. This also means that intermediate goods firms earn zero profits, 
as a frictionless market means that financial intermediaries have perfect information 
on the firms so they can price their loans in such a way that the firms make zero 
profits, maximizing the intermediaries profits. 
An intermediate firms production function is the following: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡(𝑈𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼         (5) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is output, 𝐴𝑡 is total factor productivity, 𝑈𝑡 is the utilization rate of capital, 
𝜉𝑡 is the quality of capital, 𝐾𝑡 is capital and 𝐿𝑡 is labor. 𝜉𝑡 represents an exogenous 
variation in the value of capital. Since firms can sell their capital at later periods a 
variation 𝜉𝑡 will affect a firms return to capital, which in turn will affect the earnings 
of financial intermediaries. 
2.4 Capital producing firms 
Capital producing firms build new capital which they sell to intermediate goods firms. 
Capital producing firms also buy capital from intermediate goods firms, repair the 
depreciated capital and sell the repaired capital. Capital producing firms can make 
non-zero profits and they are owned by households, so any profits made are 
channeled into households. 
2.5 Retail firms 
Retail firms sell goods that intermediate goods firms produced. The retailers do not 
have any marginal costs except the price of the goods charged by the intermediate 
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firms. Retail firms can adjust prices freely to maximize profits. They can also index 
their prices to the lagged inflation rate. 
2.6 Conventional monetary policy 
In the model, there is a central bank that uses conventional monetary policy to 
achieve its goals. The monetary policy the central bank uses is determined by a Taylor 
rule with interest rate smoothing: 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)[𝑖 + 𝜅𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝑦(log 𝑌𝑡
∗ − log 𝑌𝑡)] + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡    (6) 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the nominal interest rate, 𝑖 is the steady state nominal interest rate, 𝑌𝑡
∗ is 
the natural level of output, 𝜌 is the interest rate smoothing parameter, 𝜖𝑡 is the 
exogenous shock to monetary policy  and 𝜅𝜋 and 𝜅𝑦 are the inflation and output gap 
coefficients respectively. 
2.7 Credit policy 
In this model, the central bank conducts credit policy by issuing government debt to 
households. This government debt pays the riskless rate 𝑅𝑡+1 as it is assumed that 
governments will pay back their debts. This also means that the government is not 
constrained by its balance sheet on how much debt it can issue, since there is no 
agency conflict. The households lend the funds to non-financial firms with the 
interest rate 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1.  There is an efficiency loss involved in this process, and it can be 
thought of as the cost of the government issuing the debt.  
Another equivalent way the central bank could conduct credit policy is by using 
financial intermediaries to channel funds to non-financial borrowers. Here it is 
assumed that the borrowers cannot neglect their debt, so again the borrowers 
balance sheet constraints do not limit their ability to receive this credit policy aid. The 
central bank lends funds to financial intermediaries with an interest rate of 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 and 
the financial intermediaries lend the money on to non-financial firms at the same 
rate. This means that the financial intermediaries do not make a profit from the credit 
central bank funds. Again there is an efficiency cost equal to that in the first credit 
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policy method. This time it can be thought of as the cost of channeling funds to 
financial intermediaries. 
The first method of credit policy is referred to as credit easing and the second is 
quantitative easing. As they have identical effects, in this paper they are jointly 
referred to as credit policy. The main mechanism that they affect inflation and the 
output of an economy is through the credit spread 𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡, since it increases 
liquidity and certainty in the economy, aiding investing. 
The central bank determines the amount of credit to be injected into the economy 
according to equation 7: 
𝜓𝑡 = 𝜓 + 𝜐[(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) − 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅]       (7) 
where 𝜓 is the steady state fraction of publicly intermediated assets, i.e. the steady 
state amount of credit policy, 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅 is the steady state interest rate premium and 𝜐 
can be thought of as an intensity parameter (that is always positive) which measures 
the intensity of the credit intervention. Additionally, during a crisis when credit policy 
needed, the central bank drops the credit smoothing of interest rates, so its sets the 
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3. Analysis 
Using the model introduced above, Gertler and Karadi (2011) conduct a series of 
experiments to determine the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy in 
different scenarios. In each experiment, the initial disturbance to the model is a 
decline in capital quality, which results in a severe reduction in the value of assets 
held by financial intermediaries. This disturbance was chosen because it roughly 
simulates the scenario of the 2008 financial crisis and the size of the shock in capital 
quality is set so that it results in a recession roughly of the same size as the 2008 
financial crisis. In each figure in the following sub-chapters there are multiple graphs 
that show how different variables behave in each scenario. The Y axis of each graph 
shows the percentage change of the variable in question and the X axis shows time 
measured in months, where zero marks the initial shock. In the figures, pi represents 
inflation, i represents nominal interest rates, Rk-R represents the premium charged 
by financial intermediaries, Y represents output, C represents consumption and I 
represents investment. 
3.1 Experiment without credit policy 
The first experiment considers a scenario where the central bank does not implement 
any credit policy measures, and the results of this experiment are shown in Figure 1. 
In the figure SDGE refers to the base model developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) that does not contain financial 
frictions. FA refers to the financial accelerator model which is the model that has the 
improvements made by Gerteler and Karadi (2011), meaning that frictions do exist in 
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Figure 1: experiment without credit policy 
We can see that output, consumption and investment all fall, and the central bank 
drops the nominal interest rate as a response. It is also important to notice that all 
these reactions are more severe in the model that contains financial frictions. The 
reason of this is that that the premium charged by financial intermediaries for loans 
they issue (𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅) increases sharply in the model which contains financial frictions. 
Naturally, in a model with no financial frictions this ratio stays at a constant 0, so it is 
not drawn in Figure 1. 
When the premium 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅 increases, this results in a second dip in investment after 
the initial one, which results in another reduction in output Thus output falls so much 
more in the model where financial frictions are included. This experiment illustrates 
well how significant of a difference this small distinction of friction in the financial 
market makes. Real-world financial markets do of course have frictions, and this same 
spike in premiums charged by financial intermediaries can be observed for instance 
in the European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) for the time period between early 
August and mid-October in 2008. 
3.2 Experiment with credit policy 
This experiment considers a scenario like the one above, but with one key difference 
being that the central bank conducts credit policy. The results are shown in Figure 2 
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(in the figure the 𝜐 parameter is the parameter introduced in section 2.3: in short it 
determines the intensity of credit policy).  
 
 
Figure 2: experiment with credit policy 
From Figure 2, we see that credit policy does alleviate the recession caused by the 
shock in capital quality, as output, consumption and investment all decrease less 
when credit policy is introduced (𝜐 ≠ 0). However, the effect of credit policy is not 
very large. We can also see that the more aggressive credit policy (𝜐 = 100) has a 
larger positive effect compared to the moderately aggressive credit policy (𝜐 = 10).  
The most important mechanism through which credit policy achieves this result is 
credit spread (𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅). The increase in credit spread is reduced significantly in the 
case of the moderately aggressive credit policy, and even more with aggressive credit 
policy. This results in a smaller decrease in investment, which results in a smaller 
decrease in output. 
Another noteworthy point is that inflation does not increase by much as a result of 
the credit easing operations, which can be seen in Figure 2, as this might be a concern 
for central banks who are considering implementing credit policy. 
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3.3 Experiment with credit policy and zero lower bound 
The final experiment considers a scenario with a similar shock in capital quality and a 
credit policy response from the central bank, but this time the zero lower bound limit 
for nominal interest rate is enforced. As we can see from Figure 2, the Taylor rule 
used in the model suggests that nominal interest rates should be dropped well below 
zero since the steady state nominal interest rate in the model is 400 basis points and 
the interest rate in Figure 2 falls by more than 500 basis points. This is not a realistic 
response, as it will cause a multitude of problems. Even though nominal interest rates 
have violated the zero lower bound in major economies since the 2008 crisis, these 
violations have been much smaller and it is unrealistic if not outright impossible to 
drop nominal interest rate as much as Figure 2 suggests. Therefore, imposing the zero 
lower bound restriction on this model can provide valuable information. 
 
Figure 3: experiment with credit policy and zero lower bound 
 The effects of imposing the zero lower bound on the model can be seen in Figure 3, 
and it is clear that the effect of the crisis on output is much more severe than when 
zero lower bound is not imposed and credit policy is not used. Here we also see where 
credit policy gets to shine, as the same credit policy measures have a much more 
significant effect when compared to the scenario where zero lower bound was not 
imposed. The transmission mechanism is the same as before, so the most important 
result of credit policy is that the credit spread 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅 increases less with credit policy, 
which boosts investing and output. 
 Page | 14 
 
Another noteworthy observation from this experiment is what happens to inflation. 
In Figure 3, we see that in the case of no credit policy a severe case of deflation 
occurs, which would be very damaging to the economy. The credit policy measures 
significantly alleviate this deflationary pressure. This result indicates that credit policy 
in crisis situations where zero lower bound needs to be imposed not only could 
provide a significant increase in output of the economy, but it could also prevent 
deflation occurring. 
3.4 Opposing views on credit policy 
There are arguments to be made against the effectiveness of credit policy. For 
example Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that the private sector, represented 
by a single agent that has no balance sheet constraints that affect their ability to 
obtain credit and has an infinite time horizon, sees government and central bank 
assets equivalently as their own assets, meaning that the swapping of assets involved 
in credit policy accomplishes nothing. While this might theoretically be true, it faces 
similar criticism as the Ricardian equivalence, which states that increased debt-
financed government spending to stimulate the economy cannot be effective 
because the public sector will save in anticipation of future tax increases, thus having 
no real impact on the output of an economy. Both of these propositions are very 
theoretical, and there is little empirical evidence to support them. For instance 
Joycem Miles, Scott and Vayanos (2012) point out that the representative agent 
assumption made by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) is a strong assumption. 
Additionally, they note that the assumption of perfect asset substitution is also strong 
assumption even in unstressed financial markets, and even more so in stressed 
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Conclusion 
According to the model developed by Gertler and Karadi, credit policy can have a 
significant effect on an economy. It can help an economy recover from a recession 
even when nominal interest rate have not reached zero lower bond. If nominal 
interest rates have reached the zero lower bound the effects and significance of 
credit policy is increased significantly since conventional monetary policy is not 
enough to mitigate the effects of the recession. 
The main channel for credit policy to take affect is by reducing the premium 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅 
that financial intermediaries charge. When the premium is reduced, investment in 
the economy will increase as investing is made cheaper. As investment increases, the 
output of the economy increases, reducing the severity of the recession. 
There are counter arguments to be made against the effectiveness of credit policy. 
Some researchers point out that under certain condition, the asset swaps of credit 
policy should have no effects on real economic indicators. These ideas have however 
faced similar criticism as Ricardian equivalence: for credit policy to be ineffective, 
strong and perhaps unrealistic assumptions for the real world have to be made. 
This paper demonstrates the importance of credit policy during a crisis situation and 
why it is important for central bank to implement credit policy as a countermeasure 
for the crisis. The model and ideas discussed in this paper have real-world 
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